




















ON THE OPTIMAL TAXATION OF AN EXHAUSTIBLE 
RESOURCE UNDER MONOPOLISTIC EXTRACTION 
 



























ISSN 0924-7815 On the Optimal Taxation of an Exhaustible
Resource under Monopolistic Extraction ∗
Julien Daubanes†
University of Toulouse (MPSE and LERNA)
21 AllØe de Brienne
31000 Toulouse, France.
This version, May 2007
Abstract
In a simple model of resource depletion (isoelastic demand and
constant unit extraction cost), we fully characterize the set of linear
e￿ciency-inducing tax/subsidy schemes. We show that this set is in-
￿nite and all the larger as the cost of extraction is low. Depending
on the magnitude of the latter, we show that there may exist optimal
linear strict taxes, thus allowing the regulator to induce e￿ciency with-
out subsidizing the mine industry at any date. We illustrate and argue
that the exhaustibility constraint the monopolist extractor faces can
be exploited by the regulator to relax the standard trade-o￿ between
inducing e￿ciency and raising revenues from the monopoly.
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Broadly speaking, the literature on regulating a monopoly extracting an
exhaustible resource consists of two streams. The ￿rst one assumes that the
regulator is able to precommit to a future tax/subsidy path. In this context,
Bergstrom et al. (1981) show that e￿ciency-inducing taxes linear in resource
supply are generally time-dependent. In the case of linear demand functions
and costless extraction, they show that if the initial stock of resource is not
too large, there exists a tax/subsidy scheme such that the present value of
transfers to the monopolist is nil. More recently, in the case of constant
extraction cost and isoelastic demand, Im (2002) shows that one optimal
linear tax scheme is a constant subsidy to the monopoly. The second stream
of this literature focuses on optimal Markov perfect tax/subsidy schemes,
thus not requiring an ability of the regulator to precommit to a pro￿le of
taxes. Speci￿cally, those schemes are linear time-independent tax functions
of the stock of resource still unexploited. Karp and Livernois (1992) is the
seminal paper of this strand. In particular, they show that the sets of optimal
linear time-dependent tax/subsidy and linear Markov perfect tax/subsidy
schemes are identical when the unit cost of extraction is constant and the
demand function is isoelastic.
The objective of the present paper is to use a speci￿ed model to explicitly
and fully characterize the set of e￿ciency-inducing tax/subsidy paths. From
this analysis, we aim at ￿nding a su￿cient condition for the existence of
optimal strict taxes in order to show that there may exist taxation policies
through which a regulator can correct the distortion from market power while
raising revenues.
More precisely, we use the model of Im (2002): ability of the regulator to
precommit, constant unit cost of extraction and isoelastic demand function 1.
We show that the constant subsidy he proposes is a particular policy of a
continuum of e￿ciency-inducing linear tax policies. We fully characterize the
set of applicable optimal tax/subsidy schemes. We ￿nd that some of these
schemes are surprising: increasing strict unit subsidies to the monopolist can
induce her to fasten the depletion compared to the laissez-faire outcome.
Next, we show that the lower the cost of extraction, the larger the set of
optimal tax schemes and we derive a simple condition ensuring the existence
of optimal strict tax policies, thus implying that inducing e￿ciency does not
generally prevent from raising tax revenues. Eventually, we reinterpret the
1The assumption of precommitment ability appears to be not decisive because of the
equivalence of optimal schemes under constancy of unit cost and isoelasticity of demand
demonstrated by Karp and Livernois (1992). However, this assumption makes the results
more intuitive and simpli￿es a good deal the analysis.
1result of Im (2002) and argue that besides the classical way of regulating a
monopoly through taxes, the exhaustibility constraint a monopolist extractor
faces can be exploited by the regulator to solve the apparent trade-o￿ between
inducing e￿ciency and raising tax revenues.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the general model
and exposes the core of the problem. Section 3 studies the isoelastic demand
and constant unit cost case. Here are presented our main results. Section 4
concludes.
2 The general problem
2.1 Basics
At each date t ≥ 0, the ￿ow of extraction in units of resource is R(t) ≥ 0.
Let S(t) be the size in units of resource of the reserves remaining at date t.
Then:
S(t) = S(0) −
Z t
0
R(s)ds, S(t) ≥ 0, S(0) = S0 given. (2.1)
The cost of extracting R is given by the cost function C(R) which is
assumed to be increasing, convex and such that C(0) = 02.
There is a representative household taking the price as given. Her inverse-
demand function is P(R), assumed to be continuous, strictly decreasing and
of the class of functions such that U(R) =
R R
0 P(x)dx is ￿nite. Moreover,
we assume that limR7→0 P(R) = +∞3.
The social discount rate is denoted by r ≥ 0.
2.2 Resource extraction under perfect competition and
monopoly
There is no uncertainty and all agents perfectly foresee the future. The
extraction industry will be alternatively considered to be competitive or mo-
nopolistic.
Due to the necessity of the resource as formalized above, we know that
R(t) > 0 for all t ≥ 0.
The competitive extraction sector takes the price of the resource as given
when maximizing the discounted sum of its instantaneous pro￿ts subject to
the exhaustibility constraint (2.1). The associated Hamiltonian is H(S,λ∗,R,t) =
2Of course, a realistic modeling should consider other arguments to the cost function.
We restrict them to the ￿ow of extraction, R, for the ease of the presentation.















where p(t) is the price for the resource, λ∗ is the positive and constant costate
variable and superscript ∗ is used to mean competitive4.
Before examining how the introduction of a monopoly in the extraction
will alter condition (2.2), let us de￿ne the tax/subsidy scheme the regulator
sets to correct the distortion that arises due to market power. Let {θ(t)}t≥0 be





5. Assume that θ(t) < 1 so that τ(t) > 0 and let us restrict to tax pro￿les
di￿erentiable with respect to time 6. Consistently with the assumption of
perfect foresight, suppose that the regulator is able to announce credibly
{θ(t)}t≥0 from date 0.
The monopolist extractor maximizes the discounted stream of her spot
pro￿ts subject to (2.1). Strategically, she internalizes the demand for the re-





e−rt −λMR and, assuming the concavity of the gross revenue P(R)R,


















where λM is the positive and constant costate variable and superscript M is
used for monopolistic.
Under perfect competition as well as under a monopoly subject to any
tax/subsidy scheme, the resource supply is always positive as a result of the
necessity assumption: R∗(t) > 0, RM(t) > 0, for all t ≥ 0. This implies that
the discounted marginal rents must always be strictly positive, λ∗,λM > 0,








M(t) = S0. (2.4)
The di￿erentiation of condition (2.2) leads to the standard Hotelling rule.
This gives a di￿erential equation whose solution under the boundary condi-
tion (2.4) is unique. The optimal extraction path {R∗(t)}t≥0 is determined
that way. Given a certain tax pro￿le {τ(t)}t≥0, conditions (2.3) and (2.4)
determine in the same way a modi￿ed Hotelling rule and the extraction path
chosen by the monopoly.
4Here, the perfect competition outcome is the ￿rst-best equilibrium.
5For the sake of notational simplicity, we shall prefer to use the multiplicative tax
denoted by τ instead of the ad valorem tax denoted by θ.
6This assumption is made for simplicity. One can show that all the optimal tax pro￿les
are indeed di￿erentiable with respect to time.
32.3 Core of the problem
The objective is to design a tax/subsidy scheme {τ∗(t)}t≥0 that induces the
monopoly to reproduce the ￿rst-best extraction path. We are thus looking
for all tax pro￿les such that the solution to (2.3), for any positive λM7, under



















where λM is any positive constant.
In a more general framework, where C(.) and P(.) are allowed to depend
directly on time, Bergstrom et al. (1981) study the di￿erential equation
resulting from (2.5). For the regulator can set the present-value marginal
net return to the monopoly, λM, to any positive constant, they obtain that
there exists a family of solutions τ∗(t). Under stationary isoelastic demand
and constant marginal cost of extraction, Im (2002) shows that a constant
subsidy τ∗ satis￿es equation (2.5).
In the latter model, we fully characterize the set of e￿ciency-inducing
tax/subsidy schemes. We ￿nd that there exists a continuum of solutions to
this problem and show that the subsidy proposed by Im (2002) is a particular
solution.
2.4 About the cost of regulation
The regulator may not be indi￿erent on the split of the social surplus resulting
from the taxation policy and may thus consider the cost of regulating which
is the discounted value of the transfers to the monopoly.
Bergstrom et al. (1981) show that there may exist optimal policies at
no cost, i.e. e￿ciency-inducing tax/subsidy schemes under which the net
discounted transfers are zero. We aim at going further and derive conditions
for the existence of optimal policies consisting of strict taxes at all dates.
For raising funds through the tax policy, the constraint the regulator
faces is the participation constraint, λM > 0: without leaving a positive
marginal rent to the monopoly, she won’t be willing to reproduce the optimal
extraction path. Bringing this costate variable near to zero allows to extract
more rent from the extraction industry.
7The fact that the costate variable of the monopoly must be positive for the tax to be
optimal can be easily interpreted. λM is the present-value marginal pro￿t of the monopoly
at all dates. If we want the monopoly to choose the ￿rst-best extraction path, we have to
ensure that this marginal pro￿t is non negative. This is a participation constraint the tax
policy must satisfy.
4Looking at equation (2.5) under a marginal cost of extraction, it may
seem intuitive that the lower this unit cost, the larger the set of feasible
policies and thus the easier the regulation through strict taxes. However, we
shall see that because a change in the unit cost parameter alters the whole
￿rst-best extraction path as well as the reaction of the monopoly to a given
tax-pro￿le, this is not so obvious.
3 The isoelastic case with constant unit cost of
extraction
In order to get explicit analytical results, we choose to work with special func-
tional forms of the demand and the extraction cost functions. The following
speci￿cations are the same as those made in Im (2002) and are consistent
with the assumptions of the previous section.
The demand function is supposed to be isoelastic: P(R) = R−1/α, where
α > 0 is the price-elasticity of demand. Furthermore, in order to ensure that
the monopolist program has a solution, we assume that α > 1. The average
cost of extraction is assumed to be constant 8: C(R) = cR, where c ≥ 0 is
the unit extraction cost.
Let us characterize the optimal extraction path. From condition (2.2),



















where R∗(0) = R∗
0(S0) is increasing.
3.1 Set of optimal linear tax/subsidy paths
Let us now characterize the set of optimal tax/subsidy schemes as de￿ned in
section 2. Di￿erentiating condition (2.5) and substituting ˙ R∗ from equation
8There are many reasons to think that a realistic modeling must be much more sophis-
ticated. For a discussion, see Dasgupta and Heal (1979), chapter 6. Assuming that the
average cost of extraction is constant is a way to simplify a good deal in order to analyze
the behavior of the economy.
9The derivative with respect to time of any variable X is denoted by ˙ X. Its rate of
growth is denoted by gX = ˙ X/X.





































−1/α − c > 0. (3.5)
We shall denote this set by Θ∗











Proof of proposition 1  Among the set of solutions {τ(t)}t≥0 which sat-
isfy (3.4), we have to select the optimal ones by eliminating ı) those being
negative or zero at some t ≥ 0 (for taxes to be well-de￿ned) and ıı) those not
satisfying condition (3.5) (for participation constraint).
(3.5) is equivalent to τ(0) > τPC ≡ cR∗
0(S0)1/αα/(α − 1).
Positivity is ensured for tax schemes (3.4) such that τ(0) ≥ α/(α − 1)
since, from (3.3), they are increasing or constant and initially positive. Tax
schemes (3.4) such that τ(0) < α/(α − 1) are decreasing. Ensuring pos-
itivity everywhere is thus equivalent to ensuring asymptotic positivity, i.e.:
mint≥0{τ(t) : (3.4),τ(0) < α/(α − 1)} = limt7→+∞ τ(t) =
 





0 R∗(t)1/α dt} + α/(α − 1) > 0. This condition amounts to







Optimality then requires τ∗(0) > τPC and τ∗(0) > τWD, that is τ∗(0) >





One can see that τWD < α/(α−1). From (2.2) at date 0, and λ∗ > 0, we
know that cR∗




0 R∗(t)1/α dt} <
α/(α − 1). 
In the family Θ∗ of optimal tax/subsidy schemes, one can see that some
functions are rising strict subsidies, one is a constant one, other tax/subsidy











Figure: Optimal tax/subsidy time-profiles
In particular, there is the constant subsidy proposed in Im (2002). How-
ever, this scheme appears to one element of an in￿nite set of taxation policies.
One notes from (2.2) and (2.3) that this instrument equalizes the marginal
revenue to the price so that these conditions become equivalent. In the same
model without exhaustibility constraint, this subsidy would actually be the
unique linear tax to correct the distortion arising from market power. This
illustrates that the exhaustibility of the resource o￿ers other ways to regulate
her10.
Some others optimal policies can seem counter-intuitive. Stiglitz (1976)
shows that, if the unit cost of extraction is constant and the price-elasticity of
demand is constant and larger than unity, the monopoly under laissez-faire is
more conservative than a competitive extractor. Hence, every optimal policy
aims to induce the monopoly to extract the resource faster. Surprisingly, we
note from proposition 1 that, some of these policies are unit subsidies rising
over time11.
In what follows, we shall see that the possibility for the regulator to
exploit the exhaustibility constraint the monopoly faces may allow the former
to correct market-power through the use of strict taxes.
10Another interesting example that introducing a state variable in the monopoly’s pro-
gram helps to regulate her is Benchekroun and Long (2004). They show that submitting
a standard monopolist producer to a subsidy depending on her historical performances
results in a family of subsidy rules and allows to reduce the transfers to the producer.
11This has much to do with the presence of a positive unit cost of extraction. Indeed, if
it is nil, the marginal revenue equals the producer price, thus being proportional to τ. In
that case, each rising subsidy induces the extractor to delay extraction.
73.2 Existence of optimal strict tax pro￿les





0 R∗(t)1/α dt}, is all the more relaxed as
the unit cost of extraction is low, so that below a certain threshold cost, the
set of e￿ciency-inducing tax schemes includes strict taxes: {θ(t)}t≥0 such
that θ(t) > 1, ∀t.
We shall see that this result is not trivial for the reason that a change
in the extraction cost alters the whole ￿rst-best extraction path as well as
the reaction of the monopoly to a certain taxation scheme. That is why we
choose from now on to write all the critical variables and sets as functions of
the unit extraction cost, c.
Proposition 2 ı) The lower the unit extraction cost, the larger the set of
e￿ciency-inducing taxation schemes in the sense that: ∀ c,c0 ≥ 0, c < c0 ⇒
Θ∗(c) ⊃ Θ∗(c0).
ıı) There exists a threshold cost of extraction below which market power can
be corrected through strict taxes: ∃ c > 0 : if 0 ≤ c < c then ∃ {τ∗(t)}t≥0 ∈
Θ∗(c) : τ∗(t) ≤ 1, ∀t ≥ 0.
Proof of proposition 2  We are going to use the notations ¯ τ, τWD and
τPC introduced in proof of proposition 1. For the sake of being clear, let us
write all the variables of the model as functions of parameter c.
ı) From condition (2.2) under our speci￿cations, R∗(t,c)−1/α = λ∗(c)ert+
c, what leads to g∗
R(t,c) = −αr
 
1 + e−rtcλ∗(c)−1−1. Comparing this expres-
sion with (3.1), one obtains:
 
1+e−rtcλ∗(c)−1−1 = 1−cR∗(t,c)1/α, ∀t ≥ 0.
Note that if cλ∗(c)−1 is increasing in c, then cR∗(t,c)1/α is also increasing in
c.
Again from (2.2), we have R∗(t,c) =
 
c + λ∗(c)ert−α. Using the binding




c+λ∗(c)ert−α dt, from which we see
that λ∗(c) is increasing in c, thus proving that cR∗(t,c)1/α is increasing in c
for all t ≥ 0.
It follows that cR∗(0,c)1/α and
R +∞
0 cR∗(t,c)1/α dt are increasing in c,
implying that τPC(c), τWD(c) and thus ¯ τ(c) are increasing in c. This proves
￿rst part of proposition 2.
ıı) Note moreover that ¯ τ(c) is continuous in c since c a￿ects continuously
all the variables. Due to the ￿niteness of S0, if c = 0, one can easily see that
τPC = τWD = ¯ τ = 0. Hence, by continuity, ∃¯ c > 0 : ¯ τ(c) < 1, ∀c ≤ ¯ c. Since,
from (3.3), all paths {τ∗(t)}t≥0 in Θ∗ such that τ∗(0) ≤ 1 < α/(α − 1) are
decreasing over time: if c ≤ ¯ c, then ∃{τ∗(t)}t≥0 ∈ Θ∗(c) : τ∗(t) ≤ 1, ∀t ≥ 0.
This is the second part of proposition 2. 
8Bergstrom et al. (1981) used the free extraction case as an illustration of
their model. The introduction of a positive unit cost illustrates by proposition
2 that the cost of extraction is a critical parameter when designing and
evaluating the cost of the cheapest regulation.
In our model, in the polar case of a free extraction, c = 0, one can
see from (3.5) that the marginal net return to the monopoly can be set to
nearly nought with an ad valorem tax su￿ciently close to 100% (τ = 0+),
thus capturing almost all the rent. In this case, any positive constant tax is
optimal since the monopoly cannot exert her market power 12. Indeed, in the
context of a free extraction, any constant linear tax has only distributional
e￿ect and does not alter the extraction path.
3.3 Taxing consumers instead of the monopoly
In this subsection, we shall show that a regulator can also use a consumer tax
to induce e￿ciency. The design of the set of optimal consumer tax/subsidy
schemes and its main properties is eased by the simple relation between these
schemes and the producer tax/subsidy ones.
Let {θC(t)}t≥0 be an ad valorem consumer tax so that the consumer price
is p(t)τC(t) = p(t)(1+θC(t)), while p(t) is the producer price13. Assume that
θC(t) > −1 so that τC > 0 and let us restrict to tax pro￿les di￿erentiable
with respect to time.
In this context, under our functional forms, the demand function be-
comes R(t)−1/α = p(t)τC(t). The Hamiltonian associated to the monopoly’s
optimization program is HMC(S,R,λMC,t) = (τC(t)−1R(α−1)/α − cR)e−rt −
λMCR. An e￿ciency-inducing consumer tax/subsidy scheme is a positive
function τC∗(t) that satis￿es:
 
τC∗(t)−1R∗(t)−1/α(α − 1)/α − c

e−rt = λMC,






































−1/α − c > 0. (3.8)
12On this, see Stiglitz (1976).
13Here again, for notational convenience, we shall prefer to refer to the multiplicative
tax denoted by τ rather than to the ad valorem one.
9Comparing the solutions (3.7) bounded by condition (3.8) and the solu-
tions (3.4) bounded by (3.5), the following proposition applies.
Proposition 3 The reciprocal of any e￿ciency-inducing producer tax/subsidy
function is an e￿ciency-inducing consumer tax/subsidy function and vice
versa, i.e. {τ∗(t)}t≥0 ∈ Θ∗ ⇐⇒ {τ∗(t)−1}t≥0 ∈ ΘC∗.
Proof of proposition 3  We are going to use the same notations as in
proofs of propositions 1 and 2 with a superscript C when they concern the
consumer taxation case.
The same way as for proposition 1, the characterization of ΘC∗ neces-
sitates to eliminate the non-positive solutions (3.7) as well as the solutions
which don’t satisfy (3.8).
(3.8) is equivalent to τC∗(0) < τC
PC ≡ (cR∗
0(S0)1/αα/(α − 1))−1 = τ
−1
PC.
From (3.6), solutions (3.7) such that τC(0) ≥ (α − 1)/α are increasing,
all others being decreasing. Hence, positivity is ensured for the former ones
and we can focus on the latter ones. Ensuring positivity everywhere is thus
equivalent to impose τC(0) > 0 and limt7→+∞ τC(t) = ((τC(0)−1 − α/(α −
1))exp{rc
R +∞
0 R∗(t)1/α dt} + α/(α − 1))−1 > 0. This leads to the condition
0 < τC(0) < τC
WD ≡ (1 − exp{rc
R +∞





{τC∗(t)}t≥0 : (3.7),0 < τC∗(0) < ¯ τC	







WD} = (max{τPC,τWD})−1 = ¯ τ−1. Noting
moreover that the reciprocal of a positive solution (3.4) is a solution (3.7)
and vice versa, one obtains proposition 4. 
Proposition 4 is very convenient for it ensures that the pro￿les of the op-
timal consumer tax/subsidy schemes are symmetric to those of the producer
ones and that their set ΘC∗ has the same properties as Θ∗. Hence, proposi-
tions 2 and 3 can be easily replicated to the case of consumer taxation.
As noted by Bergstrom et al. (1981), this has a practical implication: if
consumers live in a di￿erent jurisdiction from the monopoly, it is possible
to regulate the latter even if the regulator has only legal authority in the
region of the formers. Furthermore, from our analysis follows that taxing
the consumers may allow to induce e￿ciency while raising revenues from the
rent of the monopolist.
4 Concluding remarks
In a partial equilibrium model with an isoelastic demand and a constant
unit cost of extraction, we have fully characterized the set of linear time-
dependent e￿ciency-inducing tax/subsidy policies. We have shown that this
10set is in￿nite and all the larger as the cost of extraction is low. We have proved
that, if the latter is su￿ciently low, there exist optimal strict tax schemes,
thus allowing the regulator to induce-e￿ciency while raising revenues from
the mine industry at each time.
In the same model, Im (2002) ￿nds that giving a particular constant
ad valorem subsidy to the monopoly is an optimal taxation policy. The
issue of the trade-o￿ between inducing e￿ciency and raising revenues from
a monopoly has thus been extended to the case of resource depletion. We
have revisited this apparent trade-o￿ by characterizing the full set of optimal
linear tax/subsidy policies.
Because the subsidy proposed by Im (2002) is the only linear tax cor-
recting market-power in the same model without exhaustibility, and since
this policy appears to be one particular optimal scheme after introducing
this ingredient, our paper illustrates that the exhaustibility constraint the
monopolist extractor faces o￿ers new ways of regulating her through taxes.
Generally speaking, we argue that there are actually two possible ap-
proaches of the regulation through taxes of a monopolist extractor of an
exhaustible resource. The ￿rst one is standard. It consists in making the
marginal revenue equal to the price so that the market incentives of the
monopoly are the same as those of a competitive industry. This can be done
through a constant subsidy if the demand for the resource is isoelastic. Un-
der more general speci￿cations, a per unit subsidy equal to the reciprocal of
the price-elasticity of demand estimated at the optimal quantity restores the
optimum allocation. This is the way to proceed in a static world. Applying
this method to the regulation of a monopolist extractor de￿nes a unique ad
valorem tax scheme. The second approach is peculiar to resource depletion.
It consists in providing the monopoly with di￿erent incentives to extract at
each time by taxing at di￿erent rates the quantities extracted at di￿erent
dates. This approach uses the fact that when supplying an exhaustible re-
source, a monopoly is constrained on the asymptotic cumulative quantity.
Using this peculiarity of depletable resources is more ￿exible in the sense
that it allows to choose among a multiplicity of optimal policies and may in
particular allow to use strict taxes instead of standard subsidies.
Applying this second method to induce an e￿cient behavior is not trivial.
Indeed, we have noted that it can lead to surprising results on the optimal
tax-pro￿les and their e￿ects on the monopolist’s intertemporal behavior. As
an example, we have shown that a rising unit subsidy to the monopoly can
lead her to deplete the resource faster.
We know from Karp and Livernois (1992) that, in our model, each opti-
mal tax/subsidy scheme corresponds to a linear Markov perfect tax function
of the current remaining stock. However, extending our analysis with stan-
11dard functional forms to a model without precommitment ability could be
of interest to examine the pro￿les of the resulting optimal Markov perfect
schemes. Another natural next step would be to introduce asymmetry of
information in our simple model.
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